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[L ..A.. No. 22601.

In Bank.

Feb. 11, 1954.]

RECORD MACHINE & TOOL COMPANY (a Corporation),
Respondent, v. P AGEMAN HOLDING CORPORATION (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Tender-Time-Before Maturity.-When money is to be paid
at a specified time, creditor is not required to accept it before
that time.
[2] Vendor and Purchaser-Payment of Purchase Money-Time
of Tender: Patents-Agreements to Transfer.-A contract for
sale of real property, personal property and patents may
reasonably be construed to authorize payment of unpaid balance by buyer before all installments become due where
contract authorizes payment of $1,000 "or more" on first day
of every month, and also gives buyer 60 days grace "within
which" he could cure any late payments.
[3] Tender-Time-Waiver or EstoppeL-Seller under conditional
sales contract authorizing payment of $1,000 "or more" on
first day of every month is in no position to maintain that
tender of unpaid balance on August 22d to be effective on
September 5th was faulty because such balance could be paid
only on first of month, where seller did not mention prematurity of tender in its :;:efusal of tender and waited until
September 4th before notifying buyer of refusal, thereby depriving buyer of opportunity it would have had to change
effective date of tender had seller acted promptly after
August 22d notice.
[4] Vendor and Purchaser-Performance of Contract-Tender:
Patents-Agreements to Transfer.-Seller under conditional
sales contract for sale of real property, personal property
and patents may not successfully object to buyer's ability to
produce required amount of money on tender of unpaid balance due on contract, where only real reason for refusal of
tender was seller's lack of ability to give good title to one
patent, where bank in which an escrow had been opened was
ready and willing to make loan to buyer on real property
and there was no obstacle to sale of personal property, the
purchase price for which had been deposited in escrow, and
where conditional sales contract required seller to furnish
title insurance on property, a proceeding which is customarily
[1] See Cal.Jur., Tender, § 6; Am.Jur., Tender, § 17.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Tender, § 6; [2] Vendor and
Purchaser, § 197; Patents, § 4; [4] Vendor and Purchaser, § 153;
Patents, § 4; [5, 6] Judgments, § 13; [7] Specific Performance,
§ 144.
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done
an escrow when delivery of the deed and title
insurance and payment of pnrchase price are to he concurrent.
[5]
buyer's aC··
tion for declaration of
under conditional sales contract
for sale of real
and
trial
court should
further
where such matters as seller's inability to
supply good title to one patent would have
on amount
of reduction which should be made in purchase price payable,
and where an
factor in that determination would
be value of
of purchase price allocable
to patent,
as well as
has an interest in
having that determination made and
requires that its
rights be determined.
[6]
court has discretion as to extent of relief to be afforded in a proceeding for
declaratory
but where a case is made for such relief
the court should not deny it.
[7] Specific Performance- Relief- Doing Complete Justice.Where a contract is specifically enforced the court should do
complete justice.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Leon T. David, Judge pro tem.* Reversed
with directions.
Action for declaratory relief and for damages for breach
of contract. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions.
for Appellant.
Fred N. Howser and Arthur

~A,..

Worth for Respondent.

CARTER, J.-Defendant
from a judgment in an
action by plaintiff to have declared its rights under a conditional sales contract, in which plaintiff is buyer and defendant seller, to have it determined how much plaintiff still
owes under the contract, and for damages for breach of the
contract by defendant.
According to the findings,
and defendant contracted
in writing for the sale of real property, personal property and
[6] See Cal.Jur., 10-Yr.Supp,
Rev.), Declaratory Relief,
§ 22 et seq;
Declaratory
§ 71 et seq.
[7] See
Specific Performance, § 144; Am.Jur., Specific
Performance, § 170 et seq.
*Assigned by Chahman of .Judicial Council.
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patents. 'J'he
of which
was
on execution of
balance was
to be
in installments
"or more"
interest
on the first
of each month
June 1, 1947;
was to have immediate
of the property
but could not
of or remove it; "in the event" plaintiff
the contract and makes all required payments,
defendant "shall then but not otherwise" convey the real
property with title insurance and transfer
and sufficient
title to the personal
and patents, defendant to retain
title ·to the
until
has performed; risk of
loss is to rest with plaintiff, and it is to have during the life
of the contract an exclusive license to use the patents. Time
is made of the essence of the contract.
was
to plaintiff under
Possession of the
the contract. 'l'he court found that
had performed
as require11
the
and was not m default. On
August 23, 1951, to be carried into effect
5, 1951,
tendered the then
balance of the purchase
(Defendant questions the
price in the amount of
tender, a matter later
Defendant refused the
tender. Defendant did not own prior to the contract and
has never owned one of the
to be sold under
the contract.
On September
commenced his action
setting forth the
facts and asking that it be declared that it \Yas not in default under the contract and
would not be in default by failure to make the payments on
the purchase
until defendant gave good title to all the
property and that the matter be handled by an escrow to
hold the purchase money and title papers. It also claimed
damages in that it had been unable to sell at a profit two lathes
(part of the property sold under the contract) because the
contract forbade disposal thereof by plaintiff and defendant
refused to deliver the documents of title.
The court found as above
and further, that
pla5ntiff should not be required to run the risk of being in
rlefault for failure to make the
price payments nor
should it be required to make them without assurance the
defendant could give good title (such assurance was unlikely
as defendant did not own one of the patents); that payment
through escrow was proper to avoid the risk; that defendant
had been in default under the contract since its inception
and after the tender because of its inability to deliver good
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title to the patents which it did not own; that since the
refusal of the tender plaintiff was the owner of all the interest
of defendant in all the property described in the contract;
that defendant should within 5 days of entry of judgment
deposit with the clerk instruments transferring all the property to plaintiff; that on September 5, 1951, plaintiff owed
$26,524 under the contract and had since paid $7,640.12,
leaving a balance of $18,884.21; that it was impossible for
defendant to give good title to one of the patents because it
did not own it; that defendant was not entitled to any further
payments under the contract until it could give good title to
all the property but plaintiff might make payments to the
clerk; that under the contract the delivery of the instruments of title transferring good title was to be made concurrently with the full payment of the purchase price; that
plaintiff could not recover damages in the action as it was
one for declaratory relief but might recover same .in another
action; that to avoid further litigation the trial court might
order the method of completing performance of the contract
and retained jurisdiction to do so.
The judgment declared the foregoing rights and obligations
and further ordered defendant to deliver to the clerk transfer
instruments giving plaintiff good title to all the property
and if it failed to do so the clerk should execute them; that
they were then to be delivered to plaintiff; that any payments
made by plaintiff to the clerk (plaintiff was authorized but
was not required to make them) should be used to pay for
title insurance and the balance was to be held by the clerk
until further order of the court; that defendant was '' remitted to an action for the balance due under" the contract
''as payments become due'' thereunder; that if payments
were made by plaintiff to the clerk, defendant might obtain
them upon petition to the court showing it had deposited
instruments transferring good title to the property; that
defendant was afforded the opportunity to deliver such good
title but if it failed to do so, plaintiff had its action for damages.
Summarized, it appears that the judgment declares plaintiff
to be the owner of all defendant's interest in the property
and defendant must transfer good title thereto. If it cannot
or does not do so, it must bring an action for the payments
due under the contract as there provided, presumably taking
into consideration the amount thereof and the effect of its
inability or failure to give good title to all the property.
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Plaintiff may, but is not required to make payments to the
clerk, and if it does, defendant cannot get them unless it
produces good title to all the property; any damages claimed
for breach by defendant must be asserted in another action.
Defendant appealed, contending (1) That the tender was
not valid and therefore the effect on the rights of the parties
given to it by the judgment was erroneous; (2) that the
court failed to dispose completely of the controversy, as it
should in an action for declaratory relief, in that it did not
determine the value of the patent to which defendant could
not give good title so as to show the amount by which the
unpaid balance of the purchase price should be reduced.
·with regard to the tender, it appears that on August 22,
1951, plaintiff sent a writing to defendant in which it offered
to pay on September 5, 1951, the unpaid balance of the purchase price stating that it had opened a specified escrow
for that purpose with a named bank in which it had instructed
the bank to pay the sum of $26,549.18 to defendant concurrently with the bank's receipt from the defendant of instruments transferring good title to the property together with
certificates of title insurance. It also advised defendant that
it had a purchaser ready, able and willing to buy part of
the personal property provided it could obtain title thereto.
The money was not deposited with the bank but plaintiff had
two other escrows, one of which was for the sale of some of
the personal property, the money for which had been deposited, and the other was one under which the bank was to
make plaintiff a loan on the real property to be secured by a
trust deed thereon and which would require, of course, that
title be vested in plaintiff. AJl escrow charges were paid by
plaintiff. Defendant refused to proceed, stating its reasons
in a letter, dated September 4, 1951, in which it was claimed
the arrangement did not comply with the sale contract in
that : (1) The amount was not correct; (2) there was no duty
on defendant to act through an escrow; (3) payments were
to be made to defendant by mail at a stated address rather
than at a bank; ( 4) defendant was not required to deliver
the transfer instruments and title insurance until a reasonable time after it had received full payment. The letter concluded by stating that if plaintiff desired to pay the unpaid
balance through escrow, defendant would give the matter
consideration. The court found that when defendant sent its
letter of refusal it could not, and knew it could not, give
good title to the patent it did not own and that its refusal
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was based solely on that reason; that the reasons stated in its
letter were not true to the defendant's knowledge; that the
tender was made in
faith but the refusal was in bad
faith and that
able and willing to perform;
that an ordinary and
incident to the transaction
of securing title insurance
contract called for such insurance on the real
would be that payment
plaintiff would be held in
until such insurance had been
procured.
Defendant now contends that the tender was faulty on
the ground that under the contract the unpaid balance could
be paid
on the first of the month, the
of payment
of installments on the
and not on September
5th as was offered; that plaintiff did not have the ability to
pay the
balance because it had to be realized from
the two other escrows above mentioned.
[1] It has been held that when money is to be paid at a
specified
the creditor is not required to accept it before that time.
v. Fox, 155 Cal. 106 [99 P. 489, 132
Am.St.Rep.
20 L.R.A.N.S. 338], and Rhorer v. Bila, 83
Cal. 51
P. 274],
that a vendee in a contract for
the sale of real property calling for payments in installments
on specified dates cannot put his vendor in default by tendering the entire
balance and demanding a deed to the
property.)
however, the trial court reasonably
construed the contract in the case at bar to authorize payment of the unpaid balance by
before all the installments became due because the contract authorized the payment of $1,000 "or more" on the first day of every month.
Thus there is no doubt that
amount in excess of $1,000
·could be
and that excess could consist of the entire unpaid balance. It was
that such payment could
be made at times other than the first of the month as another
clause of the contract gave plaintiff 60 days grace "within
which'' he could cure any late payment. Hence any time
within the 60 days the $1,000 ''or more'' could be paid.
[3]
defendant should not be permitted to maintain its position because it was notified of the tender on
August 22 to be effective on
5th. While it did
mention the
of the tender of all the entire balance in its refusal of the tender, it waited until September
4, after the first of the month had passed, before it notified
plaintiff of its refusal. Plaintiff was not given the opportunity to change the effective date of its tender to the first of
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September which it would have been able to do had defendant
acted promptly after the August 22d notice.
[4] On the issue of plaintiff's ability to produce the required amount of money under its tender, several factors
should be noted. It is conceded that defendant could not
give good title to the patent at any time and apparently
never will be able so to do. The court found that the only
real reason for defendant's refusal of the tender was its lack
of ability to give good title to the patent. In its rejection
it specified many technical grounds which indicated that even
if it had known that the money was to be supplied by the
loan on the real property and the proceeds of the sale of
some personal property it would still have rejected the tender.
The bank was ready and willing to make the loan on the real
property and there was no obstacle to the sale of the personal
property. The purchase price had been deposited in escrow
and it is not important that plaintiff did not prove that notice
of bulk sale was given. It does not appear that the sale
would not have been completed. The conditional sale contract
required defendant to furnish title insurance on the property,
a proceeding which ordinarily requires time, and is customarily done through an escrow when the delivery of the
deed and title insurance and the payment of the purchase
price are to be concurrent. The defendant in its letter rejecting the tender made no real objection to an escrow as it said
in the closing paragraph that it would consider such an
arrangement. For these reasons we do not believe defendant's
objection to the tender should prevail.
[5] The trial court failed to find the value of the patent
to which defendant could not give good title, or, stated in
another way, the damage plaintiff would suffer by defendant's
inability to perform the contract in that respect. However,
it did declare that title to all the property had passed, ordered
defendant to execute transfer instruments, and permitted, but
did not require, plaintiff to pay the purchase price. The
court should have completed the determination of the controversy to avoid further litigation. The inability of defendant to supply good title to the patent, one item of the property
sold, would have a bearing upon the amount of the reduction
which should be made in the purchase price payable. An
important factor in that determination would be the value
of the patent and the proportion of the purchase price applicable to all of the property allocable to the patent. Defendant,
as well as plaintiff, has an interest in having that determina-
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tion made as otherwise it has passed title to all the property
without knowledge of what amount of the balance of the
purchase price it is entitled to receive. It is true that defendant objected during the proceedings to broadening the scope
of the determination and the court .declared that defendant's
action to recover the purchase price as well as plaintiff's
action for damages were preserved, but because of the scope
of the judgment with respect to plaintiff's rights in the property (it in effect specifically enforces the contract on behalf
of plaintiff) justice requires that defendant's rights also be
determined. [6] The trial court has discretion as to the
extent of the relief to be afforded in a proceeding for declaratory relief (5 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. [1944 Rev.], Declaratory
Relief, § 22 et seq.), but where a case is made for such relief
the court should not deny it. (Lord v. Garland, 27 Cal.2d 840
[ 168 P .2d 5].) [7] Where a contract is specifically enforced
the court should do complete justice. ( 23 Cal.J ur. 509 rt
seq.) That has not been done here.
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed
to render the same judgment heretofore given, but in addition, shall ascertain and declare the rights of the parties with
respect to the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase
price, if any, under the contract, and the effect thereon of
defendant's inability to give good title to the patent it does
not own. Each party shall bear his own costs of this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

